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Augustine is commonly interpreted as endorsing an extramission theory of
perception in De quantitate animae. A close examination of the text shows, in-
stead, that he is committed to its rejection. I end with some remarks about
what it takes for an account of perception to be an extramission theory and
with a review of the strength of evidence for attributing the extramission the-
ory to Augustine on the basis of his other works.
1 Augustine and Extramission
Augustine is commonly interpreted as endorsing an extramission theory of per-
ception. Extramissive elements can be found in a number of his works (De musica
6 8 21, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim 1 16, Sermon 277 10, De Trinitate 9 3). How-
ever, at least in his early work,De quantitate animae, far from endorsing an extramis-
sion theory of perception, Augustine explicitly argues for its rejection. And yet
on a standard interpretation, Augustine is understood to endorse the extramission
theory in De quantitate animae (see, for example, O’Daly 1987, 82–3). It is perhaps
worth considering Augustine’s anti-extramission argument in detail. The present
essay ends with two sets of reﬂections. First, we shall provide a diagnosis for the
misattribution in terms of unclarity about the commitments of the extramission
theory. Speciﬁcally, we shall consider what it means to describe an account of
perception as extramissive by distinguishing different grades of extramissive in-
volvement, some, if not all, are at the core of Augustine’s thinking. Second, we
shall brieﬂy review the strength of the evidence for attributing an extramission
theory to Augustine on the basis of his other works. We shall see that, at best, it
is neither required by scripture nor reason, but represents authoritative opinon,
such as Galen’s, and so is, by Augustine’s lights, a defeasible commitment.
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2 The Textual Evidence
The textual evidence for attributing to Augustine an extramission theory occurs in
chapter 23 of De quantitate animae. The primary evidence consists in two passages
from De quantitate animae 23.43, but there is also a back reference to the second
passage at the beginning of De quantitate animae 23.44.
The ﬁrst passage is as follows:
is enim se foras porrigit, et per oculos emicat longinus quaquaversum
potest lustrare quod cernimus
Sight extends itself outward and through the eyes dart forth in every
possible direction to light up what we see. (De quantitate animae 23.43,
Colleran 1949, 66)
As Colleran’s translation indicates, the Latin pronoun is takes as its antecedent
visus from the previous line. Visus can be translated as vision or sight, but sight
is the appropriate translation as the present passage seems to be describing its
actualization.
The second passage involves the stick analogy that Alexander of Aphrodisias
attributes to the Stoics in De anima 130 14 (the Stoic analogy is discussed and criti-
cized by Galen in De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 7.7 and echoed by Descartes in La
Dioptrique):
Visu, inquam, porrecto in eum locum in quo es, video te ubi es: at me
ibi non esse conﬁteor. Sed, quemadmodum si virga te tangerem, ego
utique tangerem, idque sentirem, neque tamen ego ibi essem ubi te
tangerem.
I say that be means of sight, reaching out to that place where you are,
I see you where you are. But that I am not there, I admit. Stil let us
suppose that I were to touch you with a stick: I certainly would be the
one doing the touching and I would sense it; yet I would not be there
where I touched you. (De quantitate animae 23.43, Colleran 1949, 66)
One issue concerning either passage is their dialectical context. Both occur in
chapter 23 as part of an extended discussion of perception that only culminates
in chapter 30. In chapter 23, Augustine presents Evodius with an argument about
seeing at a distance the full force of which he is only able to appreciate in chap-
ter 30 once certain conceptual obstacles are removed. These include getting clear
on the difference between perception and knowledge, the difference between rea-
soning and reason, and understanding the rules for constructing and evaluating
deﬁnitions. Claims made at this stage of the dialogue are unlikely to be deﬁnitive.
We shall have more to say about this as we proceed.
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Let’s begin with the ﬁrst passage. It is not an unambiguous statement of the ex-
tramission theory. First, that sight extends itself outwards through the eyes seems
like a reasonable description of looking and seeing, at least as a Platonist conceives
of it. But the outward activity of looking and seeing is not the exclusive provenance
of the extramission theory. The Platonic element of Augustine’s description con-
sists in two things, the ﬁrst more explicit then the next. First, sight is a power of
the soul that is exercised through the use of the eyes. It is an instrument of the soul
(De quantitate animae 33.41,DeGenesi ad litteram libri duodecim 12.24.51). That the body
is an instrument of the soul is a distinctively Platonic thought (compare Plotinus,
Ennead 4.7.8). Second, Augustine is here emphasizing how seeing is an activity of
sight, a power of the soul. The superiority of the incorporeal soul is manifest in
its ability to act upon the sensible and corporeal without the sensible and the cor-
poreal being able, in turn, to act upon the soul (De musica 6.5.8–10; see Silva 2014
for discussion). So it is the soul that acts in seeing and so places itself in the distal
body seen (Colleran 1949, 205, n.55). The emphasis here is on the activity of the
soul as opposed to its being substantially located where the perceived object is.
The outward activity of looking and seeing is not the exclusive provenance of
the extramission theory. One might object that this ignores the illuminationist
imagery at the end of this passage—sight darts forth from the eyes and illuminates
what it sees. While it is true that the visual ray of the extramission theory is often
likened to light (Empedocles, dk 31b84, Plato, Timaeus 45b−c), the illuminationist
imagery, considered by itself, is insufficient grounds for the attribution of the ex-
tramission theory to Augustine. Other thinkers, who have explicitly rejected the
extramission theory, have coherently embraced this imagery. The illumination-
ist imagery is undoubtedly of Neoplatonic origin, but neither Plotinus nor Por-
phyry are extramission theorists. Neither are Iamblichus, Proclus, Priscian, nor
Pseudo-Simplicius. In addition, later scholastic thinkers inﬂuenced by Augustine
employ the Neoplatonic illuminationist imagery while disavowing the extramis-
sion theory. Thus Peter John Olivi compares a perceiver’s gaze to light illuminat-
ing its object (Questiones in secundum librumSententiarum q. 72 35–36) even as he denies
that seeing involves any real emission (Questiones in secundum librum Sententiarum q.
58 ad 14.8). Merleau-Ponty (1967, 185) will echo both aspects of Olivi’s position.
For Merleau-Ponty, the illuminationist imagery captures the active outward phe-
nomenology of looking and seeing even if the extramission theory provides a false
causal model of perception.
How might the illuminationist imagery be understood if it is not, indeed, com-
mitted to the extramission theory? The awareness afforded by visual experience is
like a beam of light that manifests the latent presence of its object. Vision, like il-
lumination, has direction. Light is emitted outward from its source upon the scene
that it illuminates. Vision too is outer-directed. In seeing, the perceiver looks out
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upon the scene before them. Not only do vision and light have direction but they
are both rectilinear as well. Moreover, just as illumination manifests the latent
visibility of an object, seeing an illuminated object manifests its latent presence to
the perceiver revealing it to be where it is. The explicit awareness of the natural
environment afforded by visual experience is akin to light not only in its rectilin-
ear directionality and its power to manifest latent presence, but in the manner in
which it discloses distal aspects of that environment. Just as a beam of light may
“pose” on an object that it illuminates and that it reaches from a distance, the per-
ceiver’s gaze may “pose” on the object that it presents and that it reaches from a
distance. The illumination alights upon the object it illuminates at a distance from
its source, the perceiver’s gaze alights upon the object of perception at a distance
from the perceiver. The imagery here not only emphasizes that vision is a kind of
perception at a distance but invokes an active outward extension. The acceptance
of the analogy, so explicated, is consistent with no part of the perceiver being sub-
stantially located where the perceived object is and so bears no commitment to
the active outward extension being speciﬁcally spatial.
In addition to the phenomenological aptness of the illuminationist imagery, Au-
gustine may have had another motive in deploying it, one that is consistent with
the rejection of the extramission theory. Corporeal light may be the means by
which we see, but spiritual light is the means by which we understand. The doc-
trine of illumination was ﬁrst stated in De Magistro written during the same pe-
riod as the present dialogue (on the doctrine of illumination see Allers 1952 and
Matthews 2014). Augustine understands corporeal light as the image, in the Pla-
tonic sense, of the true spiritual light. Insofar as perception, like the understand-
ing, involves a mode of awareness, the illuminationist imagery may be the joint
result of Augustine’s doctrine of illumination—that spiritual light is that by which
we understand—and the claim that perceptual activity is an image of intellectual
activity. Perception, like the understanding, is a mode of awareness afforded by
illumination.
The ﬁrst passage, while not, by itself, sufficient grounds for attributing to Augus-
tine an extramission theory, may gain new force and signiﬁcance, however, when
considered in context with the second passage. Recall, there, Evodius likens look-
ing and seeing a distal object to touching it with a stick. On the extramissionist
reading, this is a description of visual rays extending from the perceiver to the dis-
tal object. Like the stick, the visual ray is a continuous unity that spatially extends
from the perceiver to the object perceived. Should we accept the extramissionist
reading? A number of observations are relevant here.
First, Evodius is adapting the Stoic stick analogy (Alexander of Aphrodisias,
De anima 130 14). That analogy is plausibly rooted in, and an interpretation of,
Plato’s Timaeus 45b−c discussion of perception (see Lindberg 1977, chapter one). A
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primeval ﬁre within the eye, that gives light but does not burn, extends out through
the pupil. There it encounters what is like it, external light. And together they
constitute a continuous unity, a compound of emitted light and external light, ex-
tending from the perceiver to the distant object of perception in a rectilinear path.
The stick analogy captures the formal features of the Timaeus account, namely, that
the compound of emitted light and external light constitutes a continuous, rectilin-
ear, unity—just like a straight stick. However, these formal features are preserved
in accounts given by thinkers that explicitly reject the extramission theory. And
if that is right, then the stick analogy is not sufficient for the attribution of an
extramission theory.
Consider, then, one prominent account. Aristotle rejects the extramission the-
ory as providing a false causal model of perception (De sensu 2 438a26–438b2), and yet
his alternative causal model preserves these formal features. The illuminated me-
dia intervening between the perceiver and the distant object of perception already,
according to Aristotle, constitutes a continuous unity (De anima 2.7 419a12–22). But
the resulting account is broadly intromissionist in that it emphasizes the perceived
object acting upon the perceiver, albeit mediately. Speciﬁcally, the perceived ob-
ject immediately acts upon the medium, a continuous unity, which in turn imme-
diately acts upon the perceiver. In this way, the perceived object mediately acts
upon the perceiver.
Another worry concerns the speciﬁc use to which Evodius is putting the Stoic
stick analogy. It is commonly accepted that the extramission theory is one way of
modelling vision on the basis of touch. Touch may be a contact sense, but distal
senses, such as vision, may bemodelled on touch if the emitted visual ray extends to
the distant object of perception and is in contact with it. A speciﬁc form of touch
is here accepted as paradigmatic, namely, sensation by contact. But sensation by
contact is not the only form of touch. Thus, Broad (1952) distinguishes a dynamical
form of touch—haptic touch in modern parlance—from sensation by contact. But
the conception of touch involved in Evodius’ adaption of the Stoic stick analogy is
not sensation by contact. Rather, it is a speciﬁc and atypical form of haptic touch.
It is a form of haptic touch since touching something with a stick is activity and
so displays the dynamical character of haptic touch. What is distinctive about this
form of haptic touch is that involves a form of distal touch, where the felt object is
not in direct contact with the perceiver’s body (this form of haptic touch is atypical
in that most forms of haptic touch involve contact and not all involve an instru-
ment or intervening medium). So, consider feeling the wooden frame through the
padding of a Victorian hobby horse. The perceiver feels the wooden frame even
though they are not in direct contact with it. Instruments, such as a stick, can be
exploited in distal touch. Thus by means of a stick one may feel the texture of a
distant surface, or its hardness and rigidity. One feels the tactile qualities of the
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distant surface through the stick, despite not being in direct contact with it.
The advertised worry turns on two observations. First, Evodius’ appeal to distal
touch is in tension, if not inconsistent, with the extramission theory. The ex-
tramission theory is motivated by the idea that the perceived object must be in
contact with the sense. But, again, the paradigmatic conception of touch is sen-
sation by contact and not distal touch. In a way, Augustine, at this point of the
dialogue, has elicited a dialectical concession from Evodius. The extended discus-
sion of perception is inaugurated by a puzzle Evoidus’ raises about the incorporeal
nature of the soul. If the soul is not extended throughout the body, then how can
it feel wherever the body is touched? Evodius’ implicit thought, here—that the
perceived object must be in contact with the sense, understood not merely as a
the sense organ, but that organ as animated by the sensitive soul, the principle of
sensation—is now abandoned. One can feel what one is not in direct contact with.
It is because Evodius is walking back from a previous commitment, shared with
the extramission theory, that this is properly regarded as a dialectical concession.
Second, there is an oddity in Evodius’ description of distal touch. Using an in-
strument, such as a stick, to feel a distant textured surface, it seems, from within,
that we experience that texture at the end of the stick. “As if your nervous system
had a sensor out at the tip of the wand”, Dennett (1993, 47) observes. That is, in
cases of distal touch, you feel tactile qualities where they are. But Evodius seems
to disavow that: “I certainly would be the one doing the touching and I would
sense it; yet I would not be there where I touched you” (De quantitate animae 23.43).
But such a disavowal seems to be in tension with, not only the phenomenology of
distal touch, but also with the extramission theory as usually understood. If the
eye emits a visual ray that extends to the distant object of perception so that it is in
contact with it, then at least a part of the perceiver is substantially located where
the perceived object is, or is, at the very least, contiguous with it. Compare the
view that Nemesius attributes to Hipparchus, “Hipparchus says that rays extend
from the eyes and with their extremities lay hold on external bodies like the touch
of hands” (De natura hominis 7; Sharples and van der Eijk 2008, 104).
3 Dialectical Context
The force of the textual evidence for attributing an extramission theory to Augus-
tine, in De quantitate animae, crucially depends upon the dialectical context. Allow
me to brieﬂy review the place ofAugustine’s account of perception in that dialogue.
De quantitate animae is mainly charged with the task of arguing for the incorporeal
nature of the living soul. In the dialogue, Evodius, like Augustine’s former self
(Confessions 7.1ff), has a hard time conceiving of something that is both real and
incorporeal (compare the position of the Giants in Plato’s Sophist). ThroughoutDe
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quantitate animae, Augustine will give accounts of the soul’s activities and powers
that are meant to persuade us that these are not activities and powers of the body.
The question of the soul’s incorporeal nature is linked with the question of its
magnitude. Bodies are extended in three dimensions. If souls are inextended, if
they lack extensive magnitude, then they are incorporeal. But, importantly, being
incorporeal is consistent with the soul’s possession of superior virtual magnitude.
That is to say that psychic powers, the powers and virtues of the soul, are superior
to any corporeal power.
The question concerning the magnitude of the soul is subject to further speci-
ﬁcation since two senses of magnitude may be distinguished (De quantitate animae
3.4):
(1) Extensive magnitudes: magnitudes of extension, “How tall is Hercules?”
(2) Virtual magnitudes: magnitudes of power, “How great is Hercules valour or
prowess?”
Evodius seeks an answer to the question in both senses. In the sense of extensive
magnitude, Augustine denies that the soul has quantity at all. The soul is inex-
tended, and, hence, incorporeal since corporeal bodies are necessarily extended in
three dimensions. Augustine’s denial concerns continuous quantities like magni-
tude and not discrete quantities like number. In denying that the soul has quantity,
Augustine is not denying that there are numerically distinct souls. Augustine will
maintain that the soul, while lacking extensive magnitude, nevertheless possesses
virtual magnitude. Whereas the question how great is the soul in the sense of
extensive magnitudes is answered in the negative in De quantitate animae 3.4, a full
answer to the question how great is the soul in the sense of virtual magnitude, in
its powers and virtues, only emerges in the hierarchically organised enumeration
of the soul’s powers that ends the dialogue (De quantitate animae 33–36). This hier-
archically organised enumeration of the soul’s powers is also, at the same time, a
soteriology, at least in part, in that it describes the soul’s ascent to God (and it is in
this sense that it is a theoretical articulation of the vision in Ostia that Augustine
shared with Monica as reported in the Confessions).
Evodius will resist Augustine’s denial that the soul possesses extensive magni-
tude. Extensive magnitudes cited by Augustine are length, width, and strength.
A third spatial dimension, height, is latter added, De quantitate animae 6. This oc-
casions puzzlement in Evodius. The source of his puzzlement is parochial and
linguistic. Latin lacked unambiguous terms pick out the three dimensions, and so
Evodius does not immediately pick up on Augustine’s intention in speaking of alti-
tudo. He has the concept of the third dimension, he merely lacks a Latin word that
will immediately and unambiguously pick it out. Strength here translates robustam
which means the resistance offered by solid space-ﬁlling things. Speciﬁcally, then,
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Evodius doubts whether something without length, width, height, and strength so
much as could exist.
Here Evodius is echoing the position of the Giants. In the Sophist, Plato re-
envisions the Gigantomachy, the struggle for political supremacy over the cos-
mos between the Giants and the Olympian Gods, as a metaphysical dispute be-
tween corporealists, the Giants, and the Friends of the Forms, the Gods. Compare
Evodius position to the Giants:
One party is trying to drag everything down to earth out of heaven
and the unseen, literally grasping rocks and trees in their hands, for
they lay hold upon every stock and stone and strenuously affirm that
real existence belongs only to that which can be handled and offers
resistance to the touch. (Plato, Sophist 246a; Cornford in Hamilton
and Cairns 1989, 990)
In response, Augustine will offer a negative argument and a positive argument.
According the negative argument, just because the soul lacks extension does not
mean that it is not real (De quantitate animae 3.4–4.5). And according to the positive
argument, the soul must be incorporeal since it possesses powers that bodies lack
(De quantitate animae 4.6–15.25).
In the Sophist, the Eleatic Visitor convinces the Giants to modify their corpore-
alism in order to allow for justice, since denying the existence of this virtue would
be impious. Justice lacks length, width, and height. It cannot be grasped and of-
fers no resistance to touch and hence lacks strength, robustam. And it is by means
of the Eleatic Visitor’s argument that Augustine convinces Evodius that lacking
extensive magnitude does not entail nonexistence. Speciﬁcally, a tree, a sensible
and corporeal object with extensive magnitude, exists. But so does justice despite
lacking extensive magnitude. Moreover, and importantly, justice is greater in value
than the tree. The adaption of the Eleatic Visitor’s argument is meant to establish
not only that virtues like justice may exist despite being inextended but that they
may also be more excellent than any extended thing. Justice may lack extensive
magnitude and yet possess greater virtual magnitude than a sensible body.
Augustine may have established that the soul’s nonexistence does not follow
from its lack of extension, but he has yet to establish what the soul positively is.
Moreover, just because justice is real despite being inextended, it does not follow
that the soul itself is inextended. Evodius is persistently attracted to the idea that
the soul extends throughout the body that it animates and hence must itself be
extended. Augustine will argue, in contrast, that the soul is inextended because it
possesses powers that corporeal extended things lack. In effect, Augustine is argu-
ing that the soul possesses greater virtual magnitude than any extended corporeal
thing. It is the greatness of the soul that establishes its inextended, and hence,
incorporeal nature.
8
Augustine’s general response is to emphasise how an account of the activities
and powers of the soul establish that they are not activities and powers of a body.
Indeed, so construed, Augustine offers not one positive argument but two:
(1) In visually imagining a remembered body, my mental image is not constrained
in the way that corporeal images are. Corporeal likenesses are only as large
as the body in which the image occurs, incorporeal likenesses are not so con-
strained (De quantitate animae 5.7–9)
(2) In conceiving of geometrical ﬁgures abstracted from three-dimensional bodies—
such as planes, lines, and points that ﬁgure as parts of those bodies—the soul
must be incorporeal since only like can conceive of like (De quantitate animae
6.10–15.26)
At this point the central case of the dialogue has been made. More speciﬁcally,
Augustine has completed his negative and positive arguments. That is to say, Au-
gustine has argued that just because something is incorporeal does not mean that
it is less real or less valuable than something corporeal. Moreover, Augustine has
argued that the soul must be incorporeal because it possesses powers that corpo-
real extended things lack. And the incorporeal powers of the soul are either more
valuable than their corporeal counterparts or at least more valuable than the cor-
poreal objects of their activity. Evodius accepts that Augustine has established
this. What are raised are less objections per se to the conclusions of Augustine’s
negative and postive arguments than certain residual puzzles or aporiai. There are
two:
(1) If the soul is inextended, how is it that the soul grows over time as the body
grows? (De quantitate animae 15.26–22)
(2) If the soul is inextended, then it is not extended throughout the body. But if
the soul is not extended throughout the body, then how can it feel whatever
touches the body? (De quantitate animae 23–30)
It is the second residual aporia that prompts the extended discussion of perception.
A tacit assumption is at work in Evodius’ second puzzle. Attending only to sen-
sation by contact, and perhaps by regarding it as an exemplary form of perception,
can suggest that the principle governing sensation takes a certain a form. Its slogan
might be: to be perceptible is to be palpable (see Kalderon 2015 for discussion).
The idea is that the perceived object must be in contact with the principle govern-
ing sensation. The sensitive soul is the principle governing sensation. Wherever
Evodius is touched upon his body he feels it. That means that the principle of his
sensation, Evoidus’ sensitive soul, must be in contact with what touches his body,
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if it is to be perceptible. But it is perceptible. And so the sensitive soul, at least,
must be extended throughout the body.
Augustine is sensitive to this tacit assumption even though he does not make
it explicit. This sensitivity is manifest in a curious shift in example. Whereas
Evodius’ objection turns on an observation about touch, understood as sensation
by contact, Augustine develops his deﬁnition of perception with reference to vi-
sion, a form of distal perception. The objects of vision must be at a distance from
the perceiver’s eyes. Augustine’s intent is to undermine the tacit assumption driv-
ing Evodius to think that the soul must be extended throughout the body if sen-
sation by contact is to be so much as possible. Augustine’s intent is to undermine
the assumption that to be perceptible is to be palpable, that the perceived object
must be in contact with the principle governing sensation. This assumption not
only drives Evodius’ puzzle, but the extramission theory as well.
4 TheDeﬁnition
When asked by Augustine what sense perception is, Evodius, good Socratic stooge
that he is, merely responds with a list, the Peripatetic ﬁve senses—vision, audition,
olfaction, taste, and touch. Augustine explains that they are presently seeking a
single deﬁnition that would encompass all ﬁve senses (compare Plato, Theaetetus
145e–147c) and proposes a candidate deﬁnition for Evodius to defend or reject.
This deﬁnition will subsequently be reﬁned, though it will retain its basic form. It
is worth, however, discussing the initial formulation of the deﬁnition:
sensum puto esse non latere animam quod patitur corpus (Augustine,
De quantitate animae, 23.41)
Augustine’s provisional deﬁnition comes in two parts: quod patitur corpus describes
the object of perception whereas non latere animam describes the soul’s relation to
that object.
Consider the soul’s relation to the object of perception ﬁrst. And bracket, for
the moment, the signiﬁcance of Augustine’s indirect description of that relation.
In describing the object of perception as being not hidden from the soul, Augustine
is deﬁning perception, in the ﬁrst instance, as a mode of awareness (Brittain, 2002,
275).
What is the signiﬁcance of Augustine’s indirect description of the soul’s rela-
tion to the object of perception? Why describe the object of sensory awareness
as something that is not hidden from the soul? Some have found this worrying.
Bourke (1947, 112) ﬂatly pronounces Augustine’s deﬁnition “unsatisfactory” on just
this basis: “The persistent use of the negative formula (non latere) indicates Augus-
tine’s inability to say positively just what sensation is.” And Bourke’s judgment
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is reaffirmed by McMahon (1947, 104, n.1). However, I wonder to what extent
Bourke’s judgment is fair. If we accept, as seems evident, that Augustine had in
mind a mode of awareness, then perhaps to describe the object of perception as
not hidden from the soul is, after all, to provide a positive characterization of the
sensory awareness afforded by perceptual experience.
Etienne Gilson thought so:
His purpose is to make sensation an activity of the soul within the soul
itself. This is really the reason why he deﬁnes it in such a roundabout
way. The phrase “non latet” indicates precisely that the soul is a spiritual
force, ever watchful and attentive. In order to sense, it does not have
to receive anything from the organ that it viviﬁes; it is enough if the
changes undergone by the organs do not escape its notice, and come
within the range of its attention. (Gilson, 1961, 63)
Notice how Gilson understands non latere animam as the soul’s attentive vigilance.
The positive characterization that Gilson sees in Augustine’s roundabout expres-
sion is metaphysically signiﬁcant. That something is not hidden from the range of
the soul’s attention is due to the soul’s vigilant activity.
I believe that Gilson was right to see in Augustine’s roundabout expression a
positive characterization of sensory awareness. Consistent with Gilson’s sugges-
tion, one might also understand Augustine as claiming that sensory awareness is a
mode of disclosure. To describe the object of perception as not hidden from the
soul is to understand sensory awareness not only as the soul’s attentive vigilance
but also as a mode of disclosure—an activity whereby what was previously hidden
from the range of its attention is now revealed to the soul.
Consider now Augustine’s description of what is not hidden from the soul, the
object of sensory awareness. Brittain (2002, 274–278) observes that there is a cru-
cial ambiguity in quod patitur corpus. The verb patior means to suffer or undergo,
to be affected. So a natural understanding of this phrase might be what the body
undergoes. So understood, the object of sensory awareness is a bodily affection,
the way in which the body is affected. However, quod patitur might also be read
as Latin rendering of the Greek ὅ τι πάσχει. So understood, the object of sensory
awareness is less a bodily affection than what affects the body. On the former un-
derstanding, the object of sensory awareness is internal—it is the perceiver’s body
being affected in a certain way. On the latter understanding, the object of sen-
sory awareness is external, at least if we rule out cases of auto-affection—it is what
affects the body from without.
Brittain (2002) observes that understanding quod patitur corpus as what affects the
body better coheres with Augustine’s own examples of the objects of perception in
De quantitate animae. The objects of vision, for example, are external bodies located
at a distance from the perceiver. Thus Augustine sees Evodius, and Evodius sees
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Augustine, and neither is at the place where the other is. The objects of perception
are external to the perceiver’s body. In modern parlance, perception is exterocep-
tive. And this would remain true even if the sensory disclosure of external bodies
involves the perceiver’s sensory organs being affected, or even the formation of
incorporeal images in the soul occasioned by such affections.
Understanding quod patitur corpus as bodily affection, passio corporis, yields a deﬁ-
nition of what is, at best, bodily sensation. It at best characterizes a form of inte-
roceptive awareness. It is only on the understanding of quod patitur corpus as what
affects the body that it plausibly yields a deﬁnition of perception. Only so under-
stood does the deﬁnition characterize a form of exteroceptive awareness. After
all, what affects the body, the objects of perception, are external that body, and
the objects of visual perception are located at a distance from the perceiver’s body.
If perception fundamentally involves the soul’s sensory awareness understood
as a mode of disclosure, and if the objects not hidden from the soul are external
bodies, then the emphasis of the expression quod patitur corpus is on the fact that
the soul’s sensory awareness of external bodies is mediated by the body’s affection.
In this way perception contrasts with the understanding. The soul’s awareness
of the intelligible is not mediated by the body’s affection the way that the soul’s
sensory awareness is. This clearly shows that quod patitur corpus or passio corporis are
not schematic placeholders for a broadly Galenic physiology. Rather, the body’s
affection is used to specify the relevant kind of awareness involved in perception,
that is to say, a sensory, as opposed to an epistemic, awareness (De quantitate animae
29).
A preliminary deﬁnition of perception was offered by Augustine to Evodius to
defend in chapter 23. More reﬁned versions of that deﬁnition will be given in De
quantitate animae 25.48, 26.49, and 30.59:
sensus sit passio corporis per seipsam non latens animam (De quantitate
animae 25.48)
sensus est cum passio corporis per seipsam non latet animam (De quan-
titate animae 26.49)
sensus est corporis passio per seipsam non latens animam (De quantitate
animae 30.59)
There are two salient differences between the preliminary deﬁnition and the re-
ﬁned versions.
First, quod patitur corpus has been replaced by passio corporis (or, equivalently, cor-
poris passio—the variation in word ordermakes no difference to the Latin grammar).
Passio corporis is most naturally read, not as what affects the body, but the body’s af-
fection, what the body undergoes when being affected from without. However, as
we observed before, so understood, the deﬁnition does not deﬁne perception but
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bodily sensation. But it is clear and important that Augustine is not only discussing
perception but a form of distal perception, vision. So passio corporis is a kind of Au-
gustinian shorthand for quod patitur corpus that is meant to inherit its ambiguities.
So this ﬁrst difference is superﬁcial and does not represent a genuine reﬁnement
of the deﬁnition.
Second, each of the reﬁned versions include a new phrase, per seipsam, which can
be translated as by itself or directly. Unlike the substitution of passio corporis for
quod patitur corpus, this is not a superﬁcial difference but does represent a genuine
reﬁnement of the deﬁnition. How are we to understand this reﬁnement and what
is the nature of its grounds?
The reﬁnement of the preliminary deﬁnition was prompted by a counterexam-
ple to its sufficiency. Growth is an affection of the body not hidden from the soul
and yet it is insensible. According to Augustine, such failures, where the deﬁni-
tion encompasses more than it undertook to explain, can sometimes be ﬁxed with
an emendation (De quantitate animae 25.47). Thus, Augustine’s challenge to Evodius
(De quantitate animae 25.48): What qualiﬁcation can be added to the deﬁnition to
render it valid? Evodius’ answer (picking up on an earlier claim of Augustine’s, De
quantitate animae 24.46, whose signiﬁcance he did not, at that time, understand) is
per seipsam. What is the force of the qualiﬁcation? Growth is an affection of the
body not hidden from the soul and yet growth is insensible. That is why it repre-
sented a failure of sufficiency of the initial formulation of the deﬁnition. However,
it is not true that growth by itself is not hidden from the soul. Growth only falls
within the range of the soul’s attention by the operation of reason and intellect. In
contrast, the object seen affecting the eyes is by itself not hidden from the soul.
Not only will Augustine criticise the preliminary deﬁnition to motivate its re-
ﬁnement, but he will also clarify a number of issues that might stand in the way
of accepting the deﬁnition. These include getting clear on the difference between
perception and knowledge, the difference between reasoning and reason, and un-
derstanding the rules for constructing and evaluating deﬁnitions. These tasks will
be pursued in chapters 23 to 29. It is only when we have the reﬁned deﬁnition
and the obstacles to accepting it have been eliminated does Augustine apply that
deﬁnition to answer Evodius’ challenge to the incorporeality of the soul—to ex-
plain how it is that the soul feels wherever the body is touched if it is not extended
throughout the body.
5 Augustine’s Counterargument
Augustine counterargument begins with a restatement of the reﬁned deﬁnition
whose validity has been accepted by Evodius and Augustine (De quantitate animae
25.48, 26.49, and 30.59):
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(1) Perception is what affects the body by itself not being hidden from the soul.
From the accepted deﬁnition it immediately follows that:
(2) If one perceives, one’s body is acted upon.
Moreover, it was earlier (De quantitate animae 23.42) agreed that:
(3) Seeing is a form of perception.
But seeing is in some ways a distinctive form of perception. It is a mode of distal
perception. Importantly, it was also agreed that:
(4) A perceiver sees an object where the perceiver is not.
If sight were conﬁned to where the perceiver is at, at best the eye alone could be
seen. But the objects of sight are located at a distance from the perceiver. So the
perceiver sees an object where they are not.
From these premises a startling conclusion follows. Seeing is a form of percep-
tion. If one perceives, one is acted upon. So in seeing one is acted upon. And
since what acts upon one when one sees is located where one is not, in seeing one
is acted upon where one is not. The conclusion involves attributing to the ani-
mate eye a passive power to be affected where it is not. This is a passive power not
shared with soulless natural bodies. Inanimate natural bodies can only be acted
upon by what is in contact with them. The living eye, part of a whole and healthy
animal, is animated by the sensitive soul, and it is a manifestation of the superior-
ity of the soul that it endows the eye that it animates with the passive power to be
affected where it is not. The sensitive soul may lack extensive magnitude, but it
has in this way great virtual magnitude. This nicely ﬁts the pattern we observed in
Augustine’s postive argument for the intextended nature of the soul. This involved
attributing superior powers to the soul not possessed by extended corporeal things.
Thus while corporeal images are limited by the size of the body upon which they
are inscribed, the soul’s power to recall an image of an object previously seen is
not subject to this limitation. Similarly, the soul possesses the power to conceive
of incorporeal geometrical abstractions, and since only like may conceive of like,
the soul itself must itself be incorporeal. It thus possesses a power that no corpo-
real thing may have. The passive power to be affected where one is not conferred
by the sensitive soul is similarly a power that no soulless body may possess. Fur-
ther testimony to the greatness of soul, conceived, not as greatness of extent but
greatness of power or virtue.
How does this attribution of a passive power possessed by no corporeal thing
bare on Evodius’ puzzle? Recall the tacit assumption behind Evodius’ use of sensa-
tion by contact, that the object of sensation must be in contact with its principle,
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that by which one senses. It is just this assumption that drives Evodius conviction
that the soul must be extended throughout the body. For only if it were could it be
in contact with what touches the body. But if the sensitive soul confers the passive
power to be affected where one is not, then there is no need for the sensitive soul
to extend throughout the body. The soul need not be where the body is affected
for this affection to be not hidden from the range of its attention (De quantitate
animae 30.59).
Though the writing has been on the wall since chapter 23, Evodius is stunned:
That conclusion upsets me very much, so much, in fact, that I am com-
pletely stunned. I do not know what to answer and I do not know
where I am. What shall I say? Shall I say that a bodily experience of
which the soul is aware directly is not sensation? What is it, then, if it
is not that? Shall I say that the eyes [are affected by] nothing when we
see? That is most absurd. Shall I say that the eyes [are affected] where
they are? But they do not see themselves and nothing is where they are,
except themselves. Shall I say that the soul is not more powerful than
the eyes, when the soul is the very power of the eyes? Nothing is more
unreasonable. Or must this be said, that it is a sign of greater power
to experience there where something is than to experience it where it
is not? But, if that were true, sight would not be rated higher than the
other senses. (De quantitate animae 30.60; Colleran 1949, 87)
The reason that corporeal things lack the passive power to be affected where they
are not is because, being corporeal and extended, they are conﬁned to the place
where they are. The soul, being inextended and not so conﬁned, may confer this
passive power on a body that it animates.
Augustine thus explicitly rejects the principle that drove Evodius’ aporia—to be
perceptible is to be palpable to sense, that the perceived object must be in contact
with the principle governing sensation. But this is the principle that drives ex-
tramission theories as well. ThusAugustine’s counterargument is an anti-extramission
argument. A failure to recognize this, and so misattribute to Augustine a commit-
ment to extramission, is due, at least in part, to unclarity about the commitments
of the extramission theory.
6 TheGrades of Extramissive Involvement
It is worth getting clear about what, exactly, it means to describe perception as
extramissive. On the basis of our discussion so far, we are in a position to usefully
distinguish different grades of extramissive involvement. It is only the ﬁfth and
highest grade that incurs a genuine commitment to extramission:
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(1) Perception must at least centrally involve the activity of the perceiver;
(2) This activity is outer directed—in the case of vision, this outer-directed activity
is rectilinear;
(3) This outer-directed activity of the perceiver constitutes, at least in part, their
perception;
(4) The is outer-directed activity that constitutes, at least in part, the percep-
tion of an object involves something spatially extending to the distal object
of perception—in the case of vision, along a rectilinear path—so that at least
part of the perceiver is substantially located where the the perceived object is
or is, at the very least, contiguous with it;
(5) To be perceptible is to be palpable, the perceived object must be in contact
with the principle governing sensation.
The ﬁrst grade is far too weak to incur genuine commitment to extramission.
Perception is not even identiﬁed with activity but is only claimed to centrally in-
volve activity. Many thinkers accept that perception at least centrally involves
activity without accepting, as well, the extramission theory.
The ﬁrst two grades, considered jointly, are insufficient for extramission. Taken
together they are equivalent to the claim that vision centrally involves rectilinear,
outer-directed activity. So understood, they might reasonably be taken to jointly
describe looking and seeing. It is not implausible to think that in order to visually
perceive an external scene, the perceiver must look at that scene, where looking
involves directing one’s visual awareness to that scene. Looking, so conceived, is a
outer-directed activity of the perceiver that is rectilinear. It determines a line of
sight. Plausibly though it may be, the principle—to see, one must look—is a sub-
stantive claim that not all may endorse. And yet it falls short of the extramission
theory. Notice that the ﬁrst two grades jointly capture Augustine’s claim when he
writes “Sight extends itself outward and through the eyes darts forth far in every
possible direction to light up what we see” (Augustine, De quantitate animae, 23 43;
Colleran 1949, 66). Notice, as well, that in determining lines of sight, the ﬁrst two
grades form a sufficient basis for geometrical optics of the kind developed by Eu-
clid, Hero, and Ptolemy, a fact recognized by Philoponus, but not fully exploited
until Ibn al-Haytham.
The third grade introduces a further substantive commitment. One may accept
the principle that to see, one must look, and yet deny that looking constitutes,
even in part, seeing. So the third grade is a further commitment. But even the
three grades taken together are insufficient for a commitment to extramission.
Contemporary enactivists, for example, such as Noë (2004), accept something like
the ﬁrst three grades, but enactivism is not a species of extramission.
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It can seem that the fourth grade of extramissive involvement is what incurs a
genuine commitment to extramission. It is only when the outer-directed activity
of the perceiver that constitutes, at least in part, their perception of the object
is conceived as something spatially extending to the distal object so that it is in
contact with that object do we get a genuine commitment to extramission. But
perhaps that is overhasty.
Francisco Suarez (Commentaria una cumquestionibus in librosAristotelis de anima 3.17.1)
marks a distinction between accounts where vision occurs at the point where the
ray meets the perceived object and accounts where the object’s visible form must
somehow be reﬂected back to the eye ﬁrst. Suarez cites Galen, in De Placitis Hip-
pocratis et Platonis 7, as attributing the latter account to Plato in the Theaetetus and
Laws 6. The latter accounts, while involving extramissive elements, seem more
aptly deemed interactionist, as vision is the result of the interaction of the per-
ceiver’s activity and the activity of the object perceived (Smith 1996, 22–23, Remes
2014, and Squire 2016). At any rate, such accounts not only involve extramissive
elements but intromissive elements as well. So the latter accounts are not purely
extramissive. Only the former accounts count as purely extramissive. If that is
right, then the fourth grade may be accepted without genuine commitment to the
extramission theory.
Consider, then, the former, purely extramissive, accounts where vision occurs
at the point where the ray meets the perceived object. Perception is understood
to be at least modelled on, if not a form of, sensation by contact. Its principle is:
to be perceptible is to be palpable. It is the ﬁfth and highest grade of extramissive
involvement that generates the requirement that at least a part of the perceiver
spatially extend to the distal object of perception. Only in this way could it be pal-
pable to perception and so perceived. Of course, the latter, interactionist accounts
also generates that requirement, but they generate that requirement on the basis of
different explanatory principles. So it is the ﬁfth and highest grade of extramissive
involvement that incurs a genuine commitment to the extramission theory.
Unclarity about the commitments of the extramission theory is aided and abet-
ted, in certain circumstances, by the application of a certain methodological stric-
ture. Some modern commentators have marked a distinction between the psy-
chological and the physiological claims that Augustine makes. Moreover, there is
a subsequent tendency to interpret Augustine’s commitment to extramission as a
physiological claim about vision. So understood, the extramission theory is sim-
ply a false causal model of distal perception and may be dismissed as a piece of
antiquated physiology.
Allow me to make two observations about this. First, in discussions of the soul
in late antiquity, psychological and physiological issues are intertwined, which is
not to say confused. Consideration of the psychological is not so easily separated
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from the physiological. Second, and more fundamentally, there is more to the ex-
tramission theory than a false causal model. The extramission theory, in its ﬁfth
and highest grade, essentially involves a psychological claim, that the perceived
object must be in contact with the principle governing sensation. And the ﬁrst
three grades of extramissive involvement make important claims about the active,
outer-directed phenomenology of vision. It would be a mistake to dismiss the ex-
tramission theory merely on the grounds of being an antiquated physiology. The
extramission theory essentially involves a principle governing sensory presentation
and makes important claims about the phenomenology of vision.
7 Extramission in the AugustinianCorpus
In this ﬁnal section we shall brieﬂy review the strength of evidence for attributing
an extramission theory to Augustine on the basis of his other works. At best, it is
neither required by scripture nor reason, but is authoritative opinion, and so a de-
feasible commitment, by Augustine’s lights. At times he complains of its subtlety
and obscurity, emphasizing its failure to be clearly demonstrated. Many passages
involving extramissive elements are, in fact, making a point about something other
than perception. And very often this point is independent of the truth of the ex-
tramission theory. And sometimes Augustine will pursue his point even when it
proves to be in tension with the extramission theory. I conclude that the extramis-
sion theory is not a central element in Augustine’s thinking about perception. That
he was nonetheless persistently drawn to it is explicable. And not just because it
was the authoritative opinion of Plato, Ptolemy, and Galen. Rather, perception is
the soul’s activity using the eye as an instrument. Augustine understands this in a
way that commits him to the ﬁrst three grades of extramissive involvement.
7.1 Demusica
In De musica, Augustine compares the way in which the activity of memory com-
prehends the temporally distant to the way in which the activity of sight, as the
extramission theory conceives of it, comprehends the spatially distant:
Then, as the diffusion of rays shining out into the open from tiny pupils
of the eye, and belonging therefore to our body, in such a way that,
although the things we see are placed at a distance, they are yet quick-
ened by the soul, so, just as we are helped by their effusion in compre-
hending place-spans, the memory too, because it is somehow the light
of time-spans, so far comprehends these time-spans as in its own way
ot to can be projected. (De musica 6 8 21; Taliaferro 1947, 346)
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Augustine’s point here is about memory, that it is somehow the light of time-spans
that discloses the temporally distant. That point can be made, and made as Augus-
tine does by analogy with the extramission theory of vision, without commitment
to the truth of the extramission theory.
7.2 DeGenesi ad litteram libri duodecim
In De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim, Augustine provides a phenomenology of focal
attention that makes use of extramissive elements:
The shaft of rays from our eyes, to be sure, is a shaft of light. It can be
pulled in when we focus on what is near our eyes and sent forth when
we ﬁx on objects at a distance. But when it is pulled in, it does not
altogether stop seeing distant objects, although, of course, it sees them
more obscurely than when it focuses its gaze upon them. Nevertheless,
the light which is in the eye, according to authoritative opinion, is so
slight that without the help of light from outside we should be able to
see nothing. Since, Moreover, it cannot be distinguished from the out-
side light, it is difficult as I have said, to ﬁnd an analogy by which we
might demonstrate the diffusion of light tomake the day and a contrac-
tion to make the night. (De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim 1 16; Taylor
1982, 37–38)
The present extramissionist account is derived neither from scripture nor reason,
but is accepted as received authoritative opinion. It is potentially revisable in the
way that the deliveries of scripture and reason are not. Especially since the au-
thoritative opinion is no mere record of observation. The authoritative opinion
includes Plato’s explanation, in the Timaeus 45b−c, of the necessity of light for see-
ing, that the light emitted from the eye must be supplemented by external light
in order for the perceiver to see. This has the consequence that the emitted light
cannot be distinguished from the external light and so is not directly observable.
Nevertheless Augustine’s acceptance of extramission here, while defeasible and
not directly based on observation, seems genuine.
A tension in the account raises a potential difficulty, however. Extramission
theories are motivated by an apparent need to be in contact with distant sense
objects if the perceiver is to be aware of them. But Augustine explicitly denies
this in this passage “when it is pulled in, it does not altogether stop seeing distant
objects, although, of course, it sees them more obscurely than when it focuses its
gaze upon them.” The visual ray need not be in contact with the distal object in
order to perceive it, but it does so less clearly than if it were. The passage provides
a phenomenology of focal attention that seems to conﬂict with the requirement
that the perceiver be in contact with the objects of sensory awareness.
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Perhaps the present account is usefully compared to the extramissionist dioptrics
that Nemesius attributes to the “geometricians” in De natura hominis:
Geometricians draw cones which are formed from the intersection of
the rays sent out through the eyes. For they say that the eyes send
out rays, the right eye to the left, the left eye to the right, and as a
result a cone is formed by their intersection, which is why sight that can
encompass many visible things all at once, but sees exactly only those
parts where the rays intersect. This is at any rate how, when looking at
the ﬂoor, we often do not see the coin lying there, though looking hard,
until the intersection of the rays falls upon that part where the coin lies
and then we gaze upon it as if were were then ﬁrst paying attention. (De
natura hominis 7; Sharples and van der Eijk 2008, 104–105)
We get a similar description of the phenomenology of focal attention, also set
within an extramissionist account, but where the dioptric character of vision is
made explicit and exploited in an explanation for how we can see many things all
at once. For consider a ray sent from a single eye. It would be natural to expect
that it sees only that with which it is in contact. But what we see is not restricted
in this way. Reﬂection on binocular vision provides an explanation. The rays from
both eyes form a cone. Where the rays intersect is the point of focal attention
where things appear exactly in a way that is meant to be consistent with many
other things appearing as well if not exactly. However, even objects outside of the
cone are in contact with visual rays emitted from at least one eye. So an extramis-
sionist dioptrics would resolve the difficulty raised by the account in De Genesi ad
litteram libri duodecim. However beyond speaking of the eyes in the plural there is
no explicit discussion of dioptrics in that work. And though Augustine’s claims
about focal attention generated the tension with the extramission theory, Augus-
tine does not acknowledge this tension, let alone consider its resolution by means
of an extramissionist dioptrics.
7.3 Sermon 277
In 411 AD, on the birthday of the martyr Vincent, Augustine delivered the follow-
ing as part of a sermon:
In this very body, which we carry around with us, I can ﬁnd something
whose inexpressible swiftness astonishesme; the ray from our eye, with
which we touch whatever we behold. What you see, after all, is what
you touch with the ray from your eye. (Sermon 277 10; Hill 1994, 38)
Augustine is using the familiar tactile metaphor associated with extramission the-
ories. But what is it a metaphor for? Arguably, touch is a metaphor for the presen-
20
tation in sight of the object of vision. That we touch whatever we behold may be
too weak, by itself, to establish that, but it is combined with the claim that what
you see is what you touch with the visual ray. On this reading, visual presentation
is either reduced to or is at the very least modelled on tactile presentation. If that
is right, thenHill (1994, 46 n.17) is wrong to speculate that “presumably onmeeting
a visible object <the rays> send back the message to the subject...or perhaps they
bounce straight back to the eye like radar”. The rays, as Hill conceives of them, are
merely part of the causal medium through which information about the perceived
object is conveyed. But if the visual rays touch the objects of perception, then they
are perceived where they are, and thus there is no need for a signal to return to the
subject.
Augustine explains occlusion as the obstruction of visual rays. This could not be
an argument for the extramission theory, as occlusion is equally well explained on
the intromissionist hypothesis. Rather, the example of a man obscuring a distant
column, is setting up the real topic of Sermon 277 10, the “inexpressible swiftness”
of the visual rays, which will lead Augustine to an interpretation of Paul’s phrase
“in the twinkling of an eye” (1 Corinthians 15:52) in Sermon 277 11, understood as the
speed at which the body will be resurrected.
Augustine speaks of the “inexpressible swiftness” of the visual rays, but, strictly
speaking, their action is instantaneous. If two objects, one near—a man—and one
far—a column—are visible to the perceiver, in the circumstances of perception
(and hence the man no longer occludes the column), then it is not the case that
the visual rays reach the near object sooner than the far:
You don’t get to him sooner and to it later; and here he is, nearby,
and it’s a long way off. If you wanted to walk, you would get to the man
sooner than to the column; because you wanted to see, you have got to
the column as soon as the man.
And yet, as soon as you open your eyes, lo and behold, you yourself
are here, your ray is there. As soo as you wanted to see it, you reached
it by seeing it. … Just opening your eyes constitutes reaching it. (Sermon
277 10; Hill 1994, 39)
Notice that the “inexpressible swiftness” of the visual rays is contrasted with the
speed of corporeal processes such as walking. Perhaps, like Philoponus, Augustine
maintains that instantaneous action at a distance is only possible for incorporeal
activity (In de anima 325 1-341 9). After all, instantaneous action at a distance would
require a body to travel at inﬁnite speed, but bodies, no matter how swift, only
travel at ﬁnite speeds.
The contrast that Augustine draws between the speed of the eyelid in opening
one’s eyes and the speed of the visual rays thereby unleashed is also relevant:
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The twinling of an eye does not consist in closing and opening the eye-
lids, because this is done more slowly than seeing. You bat an eyelid
more slowly than you direct a ray. Your ray gets to the sky more quickly
than the batted eyelids reach the eyebrow. (Sermon 277 11; Hill 1994, 39)
Notice that Augustine identiﬁes the speed of the visual rays with the speed of
seeing, providing further evidence for the hypothesis that visual presentation is
being understood as a kind of touch by visual rays.
7.4 DeTrinitate
In De Trinitate, Augustine writes:
For the mind does not know other minds and not know itself, as the
eye of the body sees other eyes and does not see itself; for we see bod-
ies through the eyes of the body, because, unless we are looking into a
mirror, we cannot refract and reﬂect the rays themselves which shine
for through the eyes, and touch whatever we discern—a subject, in-
deed, which is treated of most subtly and obscurely, until it be clearly
demonstrated whether the fact be so, or whether it be not. But what-
ever is the nature of the power by which we discern through the eyes,
certainly, whether it be rays or anything else, we cannot discern with
the eyes that power itself; but we inquire into it with the mind, and if
possible, understand this with the mind. (DeTrinitate 9 3; Haddan 1873,
226)
Again, the present extramissionist account is derived neither from scripture nor
reason. Nor is it, in this instance, even accepted as received authoritative opinion.
Notice that Augustine, after having introduced the extramissionist imagery of rays,
immediately brackets that commitment, claiming that it is treated subtly and ob-
scurely and claims that the explanation of perceptual discernment by rays has not
yet been clearly demonstrated. The central point of this passage is independent of
the truth of the extramission theory. Moreover, it echoes a Neoplatonic theme.
We get a contrast between the activity of themind and the activity of the animated
eye. Whereas the mind is spiritual, the animated eye is a compound of the corpo-
real and the spiritual. The animated eye is part of the living being, the compound
of the organ and the sensitive soul that animates that organ and uses it as an instru-
ment for the soul’s activities. Themindmay apprehend itself in thought in the way
that the power of sight acting through the eye could not apprehend itself in vision.
In Neoplatonic vocabulary, the mind’s activity, being purely spiritual, is capable of
reverting upon itself the way that the visual activity of the animated eye, being a
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compound of the corporeal and the spiritual, could not (compare Proclus’ demon-
stration of proposition 15 of Elementatio Theologica: “All that is capable of reverting
upon itself is incorporeal”). Augustine’s point about the failure of sight’s activity
to revert upon itself does not depend upon the truth of extramission. Augustine’s
point is, in that sense, independent of the truth of the extramission theory.
8 Conclusion
The extramission theory is not a central element in Augustine’s thinking about
perception. That he was nonetheless persistently drawn to it is explicable. And
not just because it was the authoritative opinion of Plato, Ptolemy, and Galen.
Rather, perception is the soul’s activity using the eye as an instrument. Perception
is not something done to the perceiver, it is the soul, through the use of the body,
that perceives. According to Augustine, vision involves outer-directed, rectilinear
activity that constitutes the perception of the object. Augustine is committed to
the ﬁrst three grades of extramissive involvement. But a genuine commitment to
extramission is only incurred with the acceptance of the ﬁfth and highest grade.
And in De quantitate animae at least, Augustine is committed to its rejection.
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